Corporate governance, financing patterns, and the cost of capital by Tourani Rad, A & Koerniadi, H
Corporate governance, financing patterns and the cost of capital  
 
Hardjo Koerniadi and Alireza Tourani-Rad 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Auckland University of Technology 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financing 
policies in a research setting where agency problems and external financing constraints are 
expected to be high and restrictive. Using a unique self-constructed corporate governance 
index and employing the Fama and French (1999) financing model of firms, we find that 
firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms have more leverage than do firms with 
strong governance mechanisms. After controlling for the effects among corporate governance 
components, we observe that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use 
different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policies. Our results 
suggest that firms can dynamically adjust their leverage as a governance mechanism through 
compensation policy and shareholder rights.  
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1. Introduction 
Does corporate governance have significant impact on financing policy of a company? 
This paper attempts to investigate this issue by examining financing patterns of firms with 
strong and weak corporate governance mechanisms in the New Zealand stock market where 
agency problems and external financing constraints are expected to be high and binding.  
Our study is motivated on the premise that, not only because the literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm financing policy is still inconclusive, but 
also because most extant studies in this literature mostly use a specific corporate governance 
provision as a proxy for corporate governance mechanism (see for example, Berger et al., 
1997; Wen et al., 2002; Abor, 2007; Jiraporn and Liu, 2008; John and Litov, 2010)
1
. We 
posit that focusing only on a specific governance provision could be attributed to the mixed 
results as the literature also reports that firms could use a corporate governance component as 
a substitute or a complement to one another in addressing agency problems (Chen and 
Steiner, 1999; Chae, Kim and Lee, 2009; Eckbo and Verma, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Klapper and Love, 2004; Miguel et al., 2005; Rutherford et 
al., 2007). Firms with weak shareholder protection, for example, could improve investor 
protection by increasing disclosure, selecting a more independent board, aligning incentives 
or imposing disciplinary mechanism on the management (Klapper and Love, 2004; Ward et 
al., 2009). Likewise, firms with staggered boards could also improve shareholder protection 
by limiting the dilution effects of stock options or non-voting shares. These findings suggest 
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 An exception is a recent study by Mande, Park, & Son (2012).  
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that focusing on only one specific aspect of corporate governance may explain the 
inconclusive results on the effects of governance mechanisms on financing policy.  
Our study is different from prior studies in several aspects. First, we employ a 
comprehensive corporate governance index based on several corporate governance provisions 
from a sample of New Zealand companies. Employing a more comprehensive measure of 
corporate governance mechanism instead of focusing only on one particular aspect of 
corporate governance provision is expected to mitigate possible substitution or 
complementary effects of such provision with another. The only study using total governance 
index in relation to financing policy is Mande et al. (2012). In our study, we use several 
governance sub-indices in addition to total index which enable us to examine which part of 
governance mechanisms is more relevant to firm financing policy. Second, we examine the 
impact of corporate governance of firms with strong and weak governance mechanisms on 
their financing policies. Focusing on these two extreme groups of firms is expected to 
facilitate us to draw more unequivocal inference from the results on the effects of corporate 
governance on financing policy. Third, our study is the first to look at the firms’ financing 
policies using the Fama and French (1999) model. This approach not only enables us to 
observe whether firms with strong corporate governance scores use a different financing 
policy than do those with weak scores but also allows us to examine the effects of different 
corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ financing policies as well as on their costs of 
capital. There is as yet limited empirical work on this issue; our paper fills this void, albeit for 
a country with a small and less-developed stock exchange, viz.: New Zealand.  
New Zealand is a member of OECD countries but its market characteristics are different 
from those of the US. Although New Zealand has adopted the global best practice regarding 
corporate governance, there are significant institutional differences in New Zealand as 
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compared to countries such as the UK and USA, which use similar corporate governance 
codes. Previous research has also indicated that institutional features and the level of financial 
development at the country level impact firms’ performance and their access to external 
finance (see among others, La Porta et. al, 1997 and Love, 2003). Chae, Kim and Lee (2009) 
find that external financing constraints can have significant effect on the relations among 
corporate governance, agency problem and financing policy. They report that depending on 
the relative sizes of agency problems and external financing constraints, firms may use 
governance mechanisms as a substitute or a complement for payout policy. New Zealand is a 
relatively much smaller economy where the capital markets are not nearly as well-developed, 
has a large number of firms having small market capitalisation, has all firm boards staggered 
and ownership concentration is extremely high. According to LaPorta (1997) and Love 
(2003), all these characteristics are consistent with high agency problems and restrictive 
external financing constraints. Thus, our findings in this paper could have implications for 
firms in other comparable OECD countries especially those under common law jurisdictions.  
 We find, in line with the existing literature, that the cost of capital of firms with high 
corporate governance scores are significantly lower than those in firms with low scores. We 
further find that, using the overall corporate governance score index and its sub-components, 
firms with weak corporate governance provisions are more leveraged than are firms with 
good governance mechanisms. After controlling the effects of different corporate governance 
components, we report that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use 
different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policy. Our results 
also suggest that, through their compensation policy and shareholder rights provisions, firms 
can dynamically adjust their leverage as a governance mechanism.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly discusses the 
literature and the hypotheses of this study. Section three describes the methodology and the 
data. Section four discusses the empirical findings and section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Prior studies in finance literature suggest that the financing policies of firms, which 
comprise the firms’ method of financing their investments, their capital structures and their 
cost of capital, are affected by agency problems generated by the separation of ownership and 
control. For example, Lundstrum (2009), DeJong and Veld (2001), Grossman and Hart 
(2004) and Friend and Lang (1988) report that firms with entrenched management, i.e., with 
weak governance, are more likely to issue equity than debt to protect themselves from 
external corporate governance forces. Other studies however, report that entrenched 
managers are associated with higher leverage. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) find 
that entrenched managers may increase debt in an attempt to shield themselves from 
takeovers. John and Litov (2010) document that, as firms with entrenched management have 
lower costs of debt, entrenched managers are more likely to issue debt.  
Despite these conflicting results, the effect of the agency problem, in which managers 
follow self-interested objectives at the expense of the shareholders, on firm value is real. 
When managers are likely to choose the less than optimal debt level in their capital structure 
decisions, their sub-optimal financing decisions will lower firm value and consequently 
increase cost of capital. Strongly governed corporations are expected to alleviate these 
problems by implementing such approaches as linking managers’ incentives to firm value, 
effective monitoring by an independent board, preventing the dilution of firm value through 
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excessive use of stock options, or perhaps a combination of these approaches. A recent 
finding confirms our conjecture. Mande et al. (2012) find that firms with better corporate 
governance setup are more likely to issue equity than debt.  
Several studies use a specific governance provision to investigate the association 
between corporate governance and firms’ financing decisions with mixed results. For 
example, Berger et al. (1997) and Abor (2007) report a positive relationship between the 
presence of outside independent directors and leverage, but Wen et al. (2002) find the 
opposite, and yet another study find that outside directors have no significant effect on 
leverage (Mehran, 1992). Similarly, John and Litov (2010) provide evidence that antitakeover 
provisions are associated with higher leverage, but Jiraporn and Liu (2008) find that 
staggered boards, which is a component of antitakeover provisions, are negatively related 
with leverage.  
The literature also provides evidence that good corporate governance has positive 
effects on firm operating performance and on cash holding (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 
1999; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, 2007). These findings 
suggest that firms with good (weak) corporate governance have more (less) internal funding 
than that of firms with weak (good) corporate governance. Chae et al. (2009) suggest that 
firms take into account agency problems, external financing constraints and corporate 
governance when deciding on their financing policies. As firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms in place are expected to have less internal funding, they would rely 
more on debt. Thus, we hypothesise that:  
H1: Strongly (weakly)-governed firms are likely to rely more (less) on internal funding, 
they would issue less (more) debt to finance their investments.  
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Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with entrenched management have higher cost of 
equity. With binding external financing constraints, these firms would incur higher issuing 
costs to finance their investments. Accordingly, as strongly-governed firms are expected to be 
able to finance their investments with lower costs of funding, we hypothesise that: 
H2: Firms with strong corporate governance setup have lower costs of capital than 
those of weakly-governed ones.   
 
3. Methodology and Data 
We construct a New Zealand Corporate Governance Index by creating three sub-indices 
for the following corporate governance mechanism: board composition, compensation policy, 
and shareholder rights. We then construct a total index by summing the values of the three 
sub-indices. The criteria we use to construct the sub-indices are similar to those of McFarland 
(2002).
2
 A clear benefit of constructing our own governance indicator is that we are able to 
capture a wide variety of governance features specific to New Zealand firms. A potential 
drawback of this approach is that the list of corporate governance features and the weights 
assigned to each feature may be considered arbitrary. However, this criticism could be 
applicable to any constructed index, whether for professional or academic purposes. Overall, 
we believe that our detailed scoring system takes into account a wide range of aspects of firm 
governance and therefore provides a realistic score. Furthermore, the criteria used to create 
each of the sub-indices were previously applied in the Canadian context by Klein et al. 
(2005) and by Adjaoud et al. (2007).  
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The board composition sub-index measures board independence, CEO duality, 
busyness of the directors and the number of annual board meetings. This provision is an 
important governance feature (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  The main responsibility of the board 
is to monitor managers’ performance and reduce agency costs. Autonomy is measured by 
board independence, and by the independence of audit, compensation and nominating 
committees. Independent directors are expected to be able to monitor managers more 
effectively than inside directors (Jensen, 1993; Fama, 1980; and Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990). This sub index also contains measures of board effectiveness, number of meetings and 
the separation of CEO/ Chair positions. The next sub-index is related to the share ownership 
and option plans of the directors. This sub-index captures the alignment between the interests 
of the directors and those of the shareholders. In the US, since 1994, directors are 
increasingly required to participate in the equity of the companies whose board they serve in 
(Hambrick and Jackson, 2000).
3
 Chatterjee (2009) presents evidence consistent with the view 
equity holding by directors provides them with incentives for deeper strategic involvement 
with the firm and Kren and Kerr (1997) offer evidence consistent with the view that share 
ownership of directors provides them with incentives to rigorously monitor managerial 
performance. Finally, we measure shareholder rights based on the re-election of directors, 
existence of dilutive employee stock options and the presence of subordinate shares. These 
features reduce shareholder rights vis-a-vis managers. As such, firms with high scores on this 
sub index are considered investor friendly. The negative impact of the existence of dilutive 
stock options and subordinate shares will exacerbate poor performance of the firm under 
condition of economic stress. Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) provide empirical results that 
suggest when shareholder rights are strong, shareholders can use their power to force 
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managers to pay higher dividends instead of using them for private benefit. Thus containing 
managers’ opportunistic behavior is likely to make the firm less risky, ceteris paribus. 
Overall, we believe that these three major components of corporate governance aggregated 
into an overall score could provide a superior measure of corporate governance.      
To observe a firm’s financing pattern and its cost of capital, we adopt Fama and 
French’s (1999) methodology. We use the following equation to observe how a firm finances 
itself: 
  
Yt + Dept + ∆St + ∆LTDt = It + Intt + Divt                                                                  (1) 
Yt is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, interest, income statement 
deferred taxes and depreciation. Dept is the depreciation expenses. ∆St is the net newly issued 
shares, which balances the cash flow. ∆LTDt is the change in the book value of the long-term 
debt. It is the change in book capital from t-1 to year t, plus depreciation. Intt is the total 
interest expenses paid to creditors. Divt is the total dividends paid to shareholders. All of the 
variables are deflated by the value of the year-beginning book assets. We do not include the 
change in short-term interest bearing liabilities in this equation because data for this variable 
are not available. As a result, we could slightly overstate ∆St. However, as the change in 
short-term interest bearing liabilities is usually small, this omission should not have a 
significant impact on ∆St. 
To measure firms’ cost of capital of firms for each year, we estimate the following 
equation: 
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IVt-1 is the initial market value of a firm’s capital in the sample at year t-1. We calculate the 
market value of a firm as the sum of its equity plus the book values of short-term and long-
term debts. Y, I and LTD are as defined above. FS, FB and TV are the dollar amounts of the 
shares issued, buybacks and the market value capital of the firms, respectively; whereas r is 
the firm’s cost of capital.  
We then sort firms according to each index to observe whether firms in the top 33% 
of each index which are defined as firms with strong corporate governance, have a different 
financing pattern than that of firms in the bottom 33%, defined as firms with weak corporate 
governance.  
To investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms have 
different financing policies than those of firms with weak governance mechanisms, we run 
the following regression model:  
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Strong (weak) corporate governance firms are firms in the top (bottom) 33 per cent when 
sorted according to the values of total index or its components. ∆LTD is the change in long 
term debt; DBOARD_Low is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms in the bottom 33 
per cent when sorted according to the values of each index (Total Index or its components) 
and 0 otherwise; DBOARD_High is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms in the top 33 
per cent when sorted according to the values of each index (Total Index or its components) 
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and 0 otherwise; BOARD is the Board Index; DCOMP_Low is a dummy that takes the value 
of 1 for firms in the bottom 33 per cent when sorted according to the values of each index 
(Total Index or its components) and 0 otherwise; DCOMP_High is a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 for firms in the top 33 per cent when sorted according to the values of each index 
(Total Index or its components) and 0 otherwise; COMP is the Compensation Policy Index, 
DRIGHTS_Low is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms in the bottom 33 per cent 
when sorted according to the values of each index (Total Index or its components) and 0 
otherwise; DRIGHTS_High is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for firms in the top 33 per 
cent when sorted according to the values of each index (Total Index or its components) and 0 
otherwise and RIGHTS is the Shareholder Rights Index. BLOCK is the cumulative 
percentage of shares held by shareholders who hold at least 5 per cent of ordinary shares in 
the firm. IE, PBI, TTURN and TA are the natural logarithms of Interest Expenses, Profit 
before Interest, Total Turnover and Total Assets, respectively. INDUSTRY and YEAR are 
dummy variables for firm industry and firm year. 
We collect financial data and corporate governance variables from the annual reports of 
firms listed in the NZX Deep Archive database from 2004 to 2008. Because the price data 
from this database are not adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends, we collect price data 
to calculate the market value of the equity of the firms from the Datastream database. From 
the NZX Deep Archive database, we obtain 88 non-financial firms listed in 2004. The 
number of sample firms in our study is similar to that in prior studies on New Zealand firms 
(Orr et al., 2005; Hossain et al., 2000). We trim data that do not have the necessary variables 
for the regression and extreme firm variables that are below the 1
st
 percentile and above the 
99
th
 percentile. Our final sample consists of 319 firm year observations.   
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4. Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the capital structures and financing components of 
all firms in the sample during the period from 2004 to 2008. On average, the equity of the 
firms (as a percentage of either market or book capital) is larger than their long-term debt. 
Common equity as a percentage of market (book) capital is 0.65 (0.56) and long-term debt as 
a percentage of market (book) capital is 0.16 (0.19). Table 1 also indicates that firms in the 
sample make gross investments that average 14 percent of their book capital. In addition, 
firms also make substantial payments to security holders. Average dividends and interest 
expenses account for 5 percent and 2 percent of book capital, respectively. Firms also reduce 
their long-term debt by 2 percent. These cash outlays are not fully supported by cash earnings 
however, as total cash earnings, Y + Dep, account for only 11 percent of book capital. As a 
result, firms in the sample make average net new issues of security of 12 percent. 
 
[Please Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
To examine whether firms with weak governance have different financing patterns relative to 
firms with strong governance, we sort the firms based on the values of the total index and of 
each index of the corporate governance subsets. We then divide the samples into three parts 
and classify firms as strong (weak) corporate governance firms if they are in the top (bottom) 
33 per cent of each index.  
Table 2 reports firm leverage as a component of market and book capital that is organised 
based on the total index and its sub-indices. Taken as a whole, consistent with H1, our results 
suggest that weakly governed firms are more leveraged than are strongly governed ones. The 
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difference in the level of leverage is statistically significant across different governance 
mechanisms, except when sorted according to board composition index (Panel B). One 
possible explanation for the insignificant difference in the  latter category could be that not all 
independent directors are truly independent or have the necessary skills and knowledge to 
effectively carry out their monitoring duties (Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2012; Klein et al., 
2005; Pham et al., 2007). Another possible reason is that board monitoring and other 
provisions may act as substitutes. When managerial incentives are aligned with shareholder 
interests through the firm’s compensation policy, the need for the board to monitor 
management is reduced (Ward et al., 2009). 
 
[Please Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Table 3 focuses on how firms with different corporate governance levels finance their 
investments. Panel A shows that firms with strong governance invest around 12 per cent of 
book capital and pay dividends and interest expenses of 5 percent and 2 percent of book 
capital, respectively. Because cash earnings, Y + Dep, are not sufficient to finance these cash 
outlays (11 percent), these firms prefer to issue equity rather than debt to finance their 
expenditures. These financing patterns however, are not statistically different from those of 
firms with weak governance. The costs of capital of weakly governed firms are observed to 
be significantly higher than those of strong firms with high governance scores. This is 
consistent with H2 and the previous related literature such as Chen et al. (2009) who find that 
firm-level corporate governance quality has a significantly negative effect on the cost of 
equity capital in countries with weak legal protection of investors. Financing patterns of 
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strong and weak governance firms are similar when sorted according to their board 
composition index (Panel B)
4
.   
When firms are ranked according to the compensation policy index (Panel C), firms that have 
aligned their managers’ incentives with those of shareholders are observed to have sufficient 
cash earnings to finance their investments, whereas firms with a low compensation policy 
index do not have enough cash earnings and are likely to have issued more long term debt. 
Cash earnings average 13 percent and gross investments average 11 percent of book capital. 
However, when firms make payments to security holders, they issue equity (or short term 
debt) to finance these outflows. This finding is consistent with Mande et al. (2012) that well 
governed firms are more likely to issue equity than debt securities. In contrast, firms with low 
governance scores do not have sufficient cash for their expenditures and rely significantly on 
issuing debt to cover their cash shortages. The results are similar when firms are sorted by 
shareholder rights index (Panel D). Another interesting finding reported in this table is that 
the dividend policies of both types of firm are similar, suggesting that firms in our sample do 
not use dividends as a governance mechanism but, as new Zealand adopts an imputation tax 
system, dividends could be used for tax-related  purposes .  
 
[Please Insert Table 3 Here] 
  
In Table 4, we report correlation matrices for the total corporate governance index, its sub-
indices and selected control variables used in the regression model. The total index is 
positively correlated with its components. Board index is highly correlated with total index as 
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 Board index constitutes 47 per cent of total index. 
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it represents 47% of the total index
5
. The components of total index display low correlation 
among themselves. Thus, we are assured that the components of corporate governance that 
we evaluated assess the different aspects of corporate governance and do not cause serious 
measurement problems. Board monitoring is negatively correlated with compensation policy 
but positively correlated with shareholder rights. The compensation policy index is negatively 
correlated with shareholder rights. The signs of the correlation coefficients of the components 
of the total index suggest that these governance mechanisms could act as substitutes or 
complements (Ward et al., 2009).  
   
 [Please Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the multivariate regressions (Equation 3) of corporate 
governance mechanisms on financing policy. Panel A shows the regression results when 
firms are ranked according to the values of the total corporate governance index. We find that 
such corporate governance mechanisms as board, compensation policy and shareholder rights 
are observed to have no significant effects on leverage. These results are consistent with 
those reported in panels A and B of Table 3 that the effects of the components of governance 
mechanisms on leverage may offset each other. The presence of large shareholders is 
negatively correlated with the level of leverage. This finding is consistent with extant 
literature that blockholders acting as a substitute for leverage to reduce agency problems 
(Mande et al., 2012). The effects of blockholders on leverage are similar when firms are 
ranked according to the values of board index (Panel B).  
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Panel C reports the regression results when firms are sorted according to their compensation 
policy index. Consistent with H1, the compensation policy of firms with a high (low) 
compensation index is negatively (positively) associated with changes in leverage. These 
results suggest that when managerial incentives are more (less) aligned with shareholder 
goals, the role of leverage as a governance mechanism is less (more) necessary. Board of 
firms with high compensation index is negatively associated with changes in leverage 
suggesting that board and compensation policy are substitutes as the role of board is less 
necessary when incentives are more aligned. Panel D indicates that firms with strong 
shareholder rights are more likely to issue debt. The opposite signs observed between 
shareholder rights and compensation policy in Panels C and D could suggest that shareholder 
rights and compensation policy act as substitutes of each other. The results in Panel D also 
suggest that compensation policy dominates the effects of shareholder rights on firm 
financing policy resulting in lower changes in leverage of firms with strong shareholder 
rights as reported in Panel D of Table 3
6
. 
 
[Please Insert Table 5 Here] 
5. Summary 
Our paper examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financing policy. We 
find that cost of capital of firms with a high corporate governance score is significantly lower 
than those of firms with a low governance score. We further find that firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms are more leveraged than are firms with strong governance 
mechanisms. After controlling for the effects among the corporate governance mechanisms, 
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 15 observations have negative PBI, therefore we set this variable to zero. The results are similar when we 
deleted the observations. The results are available upon request.  
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we observe that firms with different levels of corporate governance quality use different 
corporate governance mechanisms in relation to their financing policy. We report that 
through their compensation policy and shareholder rights, firms can dynamically adjust their 
leverage as a governance mechanism. Finally, we also find evidence suggesting that 
compensation policy and shareholder rights are substitutes for one another.     
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  Appendix: Components of Corporate Governance Index 
Sub-Index 1: Board composition Maximum marks: 40 marks 
Independent 8 marks for boards with at least 66% independent directors. 
4 marks if 50% or more are independent. 
0 mark if less than 50% are independent. 
Audit committee 6 marks if the committee is fully independent. 
2 if there are one or more related directors. 
0 if a member of management is on the committee. 
Compensation committee 4 marks if the committee is fully independent. 
2 if there are one or more related directors. 
0 if a member of management is on the committee. 
Nominating committee 3 marks if the committee is fully independent. 
2 if there are one or more related directors. 
0 if a member of management is on the committee. 
0 if there is no nominating committee. 
Duality 5 marks if the jobs are split. 
2 marks if the chairman is also a related director. 
3 marks if the jobs are not split, but there is an independent lead 
director.  
Relationship among directors  Start with 5 marks. 
Minus 3 if marks if the CEO swaps board with the CEO of another 
company. 
Minus 2 marks if 3 or more directors are together on the board of 
another public company. 
Minus 2 marks if any director who is on more than 8 other for-profit 
corporate boards. (score can go below zero). 
CEO commitment 2 marks if the CEO sits on 3 or fewer other boards of public company. 
0 mark if more than 3. 
Formal system of board performance 2 marks if any. 
0 if there is no such system. 
Board meeting without management 
present 
2 marks if yes, 0 mark if no. 
 3 marks if the information is disclosed and both the board and audit 
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Number of board meetings committee meets at least 4 times. 
1 mark if they meet less often, or if only partial number information 
about the number of meeting. 
0 mark if this information is not disclosed. 
Sub-Index 2: Shareholding and 
compensation issues 
Maximum marks: 23 marks 
Directors required to own stock (stock 
option don’t count) 
4 marks if share ownership is mandatory an equals at least 3 times the 
annual retainer paid to directors. 
2 marks if mandatory but ownership is lower. 
0 mark if ownership is not mandatory.  
Director own stock Start with 4 marks. 
Minus 1 mark if each director has less than 1,000 shares after sitting on 
the board for at least a year. (Can go below zero).  
CEO required to own stock (stock 
options don’t count) 
3 marks if required, or if the CEO is the controlling shareholder of the 
firm. 
CEO own shares 3 marks if the CEO owns more than 50,000 shares after 2 years on the 
job.  
2 marks if more than 20,000 shares. 
0 mark if less than 20,000 shares. 
Directors in their own separate option 
plan 
3 marks if yes or if directors don’t get stock options 
Loans to directors 6 marks if there are no loans or company makes loans with interest 
payable. 
0 mark if loans are interest free. 
Sub-Index 3: Shareholder rights policy Maximum marks: 22 marks 
Re-election of directors 2 marks for annual election of all directors. 
0 mark for staggered boards. 
Stock option dilutive 8 marks if dilution is <5% of outstanding shares.  
6 marks if dilution is between 5% and 10%. 
0 mark if dilution is more than 10%. 
Option re-priced, exercise date 
extended or exchanged for lower 
priced option 
4 marks if no. 
0 mark if yes. 
Voting shares 8 marks if there are no non-voting or subordinate voting shares. 
0 mark if voting control is 5 times greater than the ownership stake.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics  
 
  AVERAGE SD MIN 25TH MEDIAN  75TH MAX 
Equity1 0.65 0.19 0.08 0.54 0.67 0.76 0.99 
LTD1 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.59 
Equity2 0.56 0.19 0.07 0.41 0.58 0.69 1.00 
LTD2 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.30 0.57 
Y 0.07 0.14 -1.11 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.43 
Dep 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.17 
∆S 0.12 0.35 -0.48 -0.11 0.08 0.33 2.43 
∆LTD -0.02 0.28 -0.77 -0.22 -0.01 0.18 0.80 
Div 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.44 
Int 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 
I 0.14 0.25 -0.47 0.02 0.09 0.21 1.55 
Notes: Equity1 is the market value of equity as proportions of a firm’s market capital. LTD1 is the book 
value of long-term debt as proportions of a firm’s market capital. Market capital is the sum of the market 
value of its common stock plus the book value of its short-term and long–term debts. Equity2 is the book 
value of equity as proportions of a firm’s book capital. LTD2 is the book value of long-term debt as 
proportions of a firm’s book capital. Book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus 
the book value of its short-term and long–term debts. Y is defined as the sum of income before 
extraordinary items, extraordinary item, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dep is 
depreciation expenses. ∆S is the net new issues of shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTD is the 
change in the book value of long-term debt. I is the change in book capital from t-t to year t, plus 
depreciation. Int is total interest expenses paid to creditors. Div is total dividends paid to shareholders. 
These variables are deflated by the beginning of year book assets. There are 319 firm-year observations 
from 2004 to 2008. 
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Table 2 
Long term debt sorted according to the value of each index 
 
 Panel A  Total Index 
  Component of Market Capital  Component of Book Capital 
  N STRONG WEAK  STRONG WEAK 
2004 70 0.12 0.16   0.19 0.22 
2005 61 0.14 0.19  0.20 0.20 
2006 70 0.14 0.14  0.21 0.18 
2007 63 0.13 0.19  0.16 0.23 
2008 55 0.18 0.26  0.19 0.23 
2004-2008 319 0.14 0.18**   0.19 0.22 
       
 Panel B  Board Composition 
  Component of Market Capital  Component of Book Capital 
  N STRONG WEAK   STRONG WEAK 
2004 70 0.13 0.10   0.19 0.15 
2005 61 0.14 0.16  0.19 0.18 
2006 70 0.14 0.13  0.20 0.16 
2007 63 0.14 0.15  0.16 0.21 
2008 55 0.19 0.22  0.21 0.20 
2004-2008 319 0.15 0.16   0.19 0.19 
       
 Panel C  Compensation Policy 
  Component of Market Capital  Component of Book Capital 
  N STRONG WEAK   STRONG WEAK 
2004 70 0.11 0.17   0.17 0.22 
2005 61 0.12 0.17  0.17 0.18 
2006 70 0.13 0.16  0.20 0.20 
2007 63 0.11 0.19  0.16 0.22 
2008 55 0.14 0.31  0.18 0.28 
2004-2008 319 0.13            0.19***   0.18 0.21* 
       
 Panel D  Shareholder Rights 
  Component of Market Capital  Component of Book Capital 
  N STRONG WEAK   STRONG WEAK 
2004 70 0.10 0.15   0.14 0.20 
2005 61 0.13 0.17  0.17 0.21 
2006 70 0.14 0.14  0.20 0.19 
2007 63 0.12 0.20  0.16 0.24 
2008 55 0.13 0.31  0.16 0.28 
2004-2008 319 0.12           0.18***   0.16            0.21** 
Notes: A firm’s market capital is the sum of the market value of its common stock plus the book value of its 
short-term and long–term debts. A firm’s book capital is the sum of the book value of its common equity plus 
the book value of its short-term and long–term debts. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% sorted based on the 
corresponding corporate governance index are classified as strong (weak) governed firms. 
*,**,*** denote significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for two-tail 
tests). Significance is reported for full period only. 
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Table 3 
Annual cash inflows and outflows as percentages of beginning of year book capital of strong and weak governance firms 
                 
 Panel A Total Index                               
  STRONG   WEAK 
  N Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC   Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC 
2004 70 0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.04 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.20   0.01 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.24 
2005 61 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.48  0.01 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.10 
2006 70 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.33  0.05 0.04 0.17 -0.02 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.35 
2007 63 0.09 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.06  0.07 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.73 
2008 55 0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.07  0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.07 
2004-2008 319 0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.18   0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.03* 0.31** 
                                   
 Panel B Board Composition                               
  STRONG   WEAK 
  N Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC   Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC 
2004 70 0.08 0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.17   0.06 0.05 0.16 -0.11 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.3 
2005 61 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.36  0.05 0.04 0.16 -0.01 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.18 
2006 70 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.33  0.08 0.05 0.22 -0.06 0.2 0.06 0.03 0.33 
2007 63 0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.09  0.08 0.03 0.15 -0.02 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.69 
2008 55 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.06  0.1 0.03 0.12 -0.02 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.05 
2004-2008 319 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.14   0.07 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.16 0.06 0.03* 0.31 
                                    
 Panel C Compensation Policy                               
  STRONG   WEAK 
  N Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC   Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC 
2004 70 0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.1 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.3   0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.24 
2005 61 0.1 0.06 0.14 -0.09 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.39  0.06 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.12 
2006 70 0.07 0.04 0.16 -0.11 0.1 0.04 0.03 0.31  0.06 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.25 
2007 63 0.07 0.04 0.2 -0.14 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.08  0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.71 
2008 55 0.09 0.04 0.18 -0.09 0.13 0.04 0.03 -0.01  0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.02 -0.09 
2004-2008 319 0.07 0.05*** 0.17*** -0.09 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.24   0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06*** 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.25 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Annual cash inflows and outflows as percentages of beginning of year book capital of strong and weak governance firms 
                 
 Panel D Shareholder Rights                               
  STRONG   WEAK 
  N Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC   Yt Dept ∆S ∆LTDτ It Divt Intt COC 
2004 70 0.07 0.05 0.17 -0.11 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.27  -0.01 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.18 
2005 61 0.11 0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.4  0.06 0.04 0.07 0 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.17 
2006 70 0.07 0.05 0.18 -0.08 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.32  0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.3 
2007 63 0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.13 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05  0.05 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.77 
2008 55 0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.09  0.07 0.02 0 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.02 -0.08 
2004-2008 319 
 
0.08** 
    
0.05** 0.15 -0.1 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.24  0.04 0.03 0.12 
     
0.02*** 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.3 
Notes: Yt is defined as the sum of income before extraordinary items, extraordinary item, interest, income statement deferred taxes and depreciation. Dept is 
depreciation expenses. ∆St is the net new issues of shares which balance the cash flows. ∆LTDt is the change in the book value of long-term debt. It is the change 
in book capital from t-1 to year t, plus depreciation. Intt is total interest expenses paid to creditors. Divt is total dividends paid to shareholders. COC is cost of 
capital. Firms in the top (bottom) 33% sorted based on the corresponding corporate governance index are classified as strong (weak) governed firms. 
*,**,*** denote significantly different from their counterparts at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (for two-tail tests assuming unequal variance).  
Significance is reported for full period only.
27 
 
Table 4 
Correlations among variables 
  ∆LTD Total Index BOARD COMP RIGHTS BLOCK IE PBI TTURN 
Total Index -0.01         
BOARD 0.10 0.90        
COMP -0.27 0.35 -0.07       
RIGHTS 0.05 0.29 0.17 -0.04      
BLOCK -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.06     
IE 0.18 0.05 0.08 -0.10 0.09 -0.01    
PBI 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08   
TTURN -0.33 0.11 -0.01 0.36 -0.16 -0.03 -0.08 0.16  
TA 0.30 0.07 0.22 -0.31 -0.03 0.19 0.15 0.27 -0.21 
Notes:∆LTD is change in long term debt. BOARD is board composition sub-index. COMP is compensation policy sub-
index. RIGHTS is shareholder rights sub-index. Total index is the sum of all three sub-indices. BLOCK is the 
cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. TA, IE, PBI and 
TTURN are natural logarithms of total assets, interest expenses, profit before interest and total sales, respectively. All 
these variables except ∆LTD are measured at t-1.    
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Table 5 
The association between corporate governance mechanisms and financing policy sorted 
based on total corporate governance index and its sub-indices  
 Panel A Total Index  Panel B Board Composition 
Dboard x Board_High              0.00  Dboard x Board_High                 0.00 
Dcomp x Comp_High             -0.01  Dcomp x Comp_High                -0.01 
Drights x Rights_High              0.02  Drights x Rights_High                 0.01 
     
Dboard x Board_Low              0.01  Dboard x Board_Low                 0.01 
Dcomp x Comp_Low              0.00  Dcomp x Comp_Low                 0.01 
Drights x Rights_Low             -0.01  Drights x Rights_Low                -0.01 
BLOCK -0.17**  BLOCK -0.18*** 
IE              0.02***  IE                 0.02*** 
PBI              0.00  PBI                 0.00 
TTURN             -0.01  TTURN                -0.01 
TA              0.03**  TA                 0.03** 
Intercept             -0.31  Intercept                -0.33 
Year effects Yes  Year effects Yes 
Industry effects Yes  Industry effects Yes 
Adj. R
2
 28.35%  Adj. R
2
   28.08% 
 Panel C Compensation Policy  Panel D Shareholder Rights 
Dboard x Board_High             -0.01**  Dboard x Board_High                 0.00 
Dcomp x Comp_High             -0.11***  Dcomp x Comp_High                -0.08*** 
Drights x Rights_High              0.10***  Drights x Rights_High                 0.08*** 
     
Dboard x Board_Low              0.00  Dboard x Board_Low 0.00 
Dcomp x Comp_Low              0.06***  Dcomp x Comp_Low 0.00 
Drights x Rights_Low             -0.03***  Drights x Rights_Low 0.00 
 
BLOCK             -0.20***  BLOCK                -0.21*** 
IE              0.02***  IE                 0.01** 
PBI              0.00  PBI                 0.00 
TTURN              0.02  TTURN                 0.00 
TA              0.03**   TA                 0.03** 
Intercept            -0.59**  Intercept                -0.40 
Year effects Yes  Year effects Yes 
Industry effects Yes  Industry effects Yes 
Adj. R
2
 42.80%   Adj. R
2
      34.97% 
The dependent variable is change in long term debt. DBOARD_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the 
values of each index and 0 otherwise, DBOARD_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index 
and 0 otherwise, BOARD is Board Index, DCOMP_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the values of each 
index and 0 otherwise, DCOMP_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 otherwise, 
COMP is Compensation Policy Index, DRIGHTS_Low is a dummy of 1 for firms in the bottom 33% when sorted according to the values of each 
index and 0 otherwise, DRIGHTS_High is a dummy of 1 for firms in the top 33% when sorted according to the values of each index and 0 
otherwise, RIGHTS is Shareholder Rights Index. IE, PBI, TTURN and TA respectively are the natural logarithms of Interest Expenses, Profit 
before Interest, Total Turnover and Total Assets.  *, **, *** are significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
